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Abstract
The determinants of international currency received a lot of academic at-
tention since great recession. Recent empirical studies in history and inter-
national economics confirmed the importance of financial market development
in this process. To provide micro-foundation for such observation, I built a
two-country monetary search model with financial friction. Trade takes time,
and the lack of trust makes importer and exporter rely on bank-intermediated
finance. The choice of international currency is related with terms of trade, in-
flation level, and financial market development. The effect of monetary policy
on international trade differs according to currency regime. Related topic such
as size effect and global imbalance is also discussed.
∗I’m indebted to Wing Woo for continuous guidance and support. I also thank Athanasios
Geromichalos, Seungduck Lee, and Mingzhi Xu for helpful comments and suggestions.
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1 Introduction
The international monetary system came under serious doubt after the global finan-
cial crisis in 2008. Many alternatives have been proposed to replace the exorbitant
privilege of US dollar, such as SDR (Zhou, 2009), a multipolar system (Eichengreen,
2011), and a single world currency (Mundell, 2012). Beyond the political implication
of such dramatic power shift, it’s economically interesting to consider the determi-
nants of international currency, especially the rise-up of a previously national currency
and the possibility of multiple international currencies.
Here international currency is defined as a fiat money not only circulating in its
home country but also held by foreigners. As a store of value, it could be central bank’s
foreign reserve or private person’s investment instrument. As a medium of exchange,
it could smooth government’s foreign exchange intervention or settle international
trade. As a unit of account, it denominates financial transaction or becomes the
anchor of other currencies. Table 1 summarized these functions. This paper is mainly
concerned with medium of exchange as the function of international currency1
Academic research traditionally focused on economy of scale and path dependence
in the evolution of international currency. In this view, size effect is important since
trade volume helps reduce transaction cost. The status of international currency
therefore requires a large economy. This size effect also ensures path dependence and
incumbency advantage so that, once a currency becomes international, people have
no incentive of deviation.
Historical experience of international trade and monetary system, however, shows
another picture. US GDP surpassed Great Britain in 1870s, and US share of world
export surged from 14.1% in 1872 to 22.1% in 1913, but the international role of US
dollar was essentially zero, while Sterling is estimated to have invoiced over 60% of
1In practice, there’s a lot of difference among pricing, invoicing, and settlement currency, although
theoretical model usually takes them as equivalent. Pricing or invoicing currency might be considered
as unit of account, while settlement currency is naturally classified as medium of exchange. Friberg
and Wilander (2008) conducted a questionnaire study on the currency choice of Swedish exporter in
2006, and most firms reported to use the same currency in over 90% of their revenue. Of course, the
discrepancy could be large, especially for developing countries. Reiss (2015) found that, for Brazil
real, its use as invoicing currency is more than settlement currency. whereas Yu (2013) suggested
that RMB was used more as settlement currency than invoicing currency.
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world trade by early twentieth century (Broz, 1997). Similarly, China became the
leader of international merchandise trade in 2013 by WTO estimation, but RMB
largely remains national. The advantage of incumbency is also open to question.
Eichengreen and Flandreau (2012) showed that US dollar and sterling shared the
status of international currency as early as 1920s. Recent empirical literature used
new dataset to emphasize the importance of financial development. One leading
research is Ito and Chinn (2013) that documented the relationship between capital
account liberalization and trade invoice currency, attributing RMB’s low degree of
internationalization to the drawback of its financial system.
This paper tries to provide micro-foundation for such observation and discuss
monetary policy in different currency regimes. To that end, I incorporated financial
friction into the two-country model in Zhang (2014). In my model, trade takes time,
and agents disagree on the timing of shipment and payment, so they rely on bank-
intermediated finance. Agent’s choice of international currency is related with terms
of trade, monetary policy, and financial market condition. Three currency regimes
naturally arise: single international currency, producer currency pricing (PCP), and
local currency pricing (LCP)2. The impact of monetary policy on trade and welfare
would differ according to currency regime.
This paper also follows a long tradition of explicitly modeling bank and credit since
Diamond and Dybvig (1983). One difficulty in this field is the conflict between money
and credit, as pointed out by Berentsen et al. (2007). There must be an absence of
record keeping for money to be essential, but credit requires record keeping in case
of default3. The inherent tension between money and credit is not present in this
model thanks to the institutional setup of trade finance: importer has no incentive
to default since that would make him lose the ownership of goods purchased from
exporter. Money could coexist with credit in an environment without record keeping,
and credit improves welfare by facilitating trade.
2This classification is certainly loose and imprecise when it treats pricing and settlement currency
as equal, but, as mentioned earlier, a lot of empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.
3This conflict is solved in Berentsen et al. (2007) by assuming banks are able to record financial
transaction but not goods trade, so fiat money still circulates as medium of exchange but credit
becomes feasible. Bignon et al. (2013) continued this approach to discuss the implication for currency
union and financial integration. However, search model in this fashion still forces foreign consumption
to be settled by foreign currency or credit, so it’s improper for the discussion of international currency.
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 reviews economic literature on
international currency. Part 3 documents the practice of trade finance, especially the
mechanism of letter of credit (LC). Part 4 describes model environment and defines
monetary equilibrium. Part 5 undergoes discussion on related topic with numerical
example. Part 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
Academic research on international currency spans economics and politics. Interested
reader could refer to Be´nassy-Que´re´ (2015) for a systematic review. This section is
focused on economic theories that regarded international currency as the outcome of
decentralized choice by private sector.
2.1 Trade model
This strand of literature mostly used a general equilibrium model of 3-country or
N-country to explain the phenomenon of international vehicle currency (for example,
Krugman, 1979; Rey, 2001; Devereux and Shi, 2013). International vehicle currency
(IVC) is issued by (say) country A but used in the bilateral trade between country B
and C. In models of this fashion, producer and consumer hold only home currency,
and foreign exchange transaction is undertaken by financial intermediary or trading
post, which has an increasing-return-to-scale technology that lowers transaction cost
with a large trade volume. Under the assumption of cash in advance and PCP,
agent’s choice of invoicing currency is exogenously given. The existence of a general
equilibrium with IVC is crucially dependent on economic openness. Therefore, the
currency issued by a country intensively engaged in international trade would emerge
as IVC. This thick market or network externality also makes the status of IVC a
natural monopoly. The advantage of such model comes from its nature of general
equilibrium: the welfare gain of using IVC could be analyzed, and discussion of
monetary policy is feasible. An obvious drawback is the lack of micro-foundation:
agent’s choice of invoicing currency is exogenous, so it’s impossible to explain the rise
and fall of different currency regimes.
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2.2 Invoicing currency model
With the increasing data availability at firm and industry level, a microeconomic
theory of invoicing currency prospers in recent years. This type of model endogenized
exporter’s choice of invoicing currency by letting them set price before exchange rate
is realized. For PCP, there’s uncertainty in foreign demand and production cost, while
LCP makes future price unpredictable. So exporters choose invoicing currency mainly
to mitigate the risk arising from exchange rate volatility. Bacchetta and Van Wincoop
(2005) showed that producer’s currency choice is affected by competition in foreign
markets: higher level of exporter’s market share and differentiation tends to promote
PCP. Goldberg and Tille (2008) continued this approach to include vehicle currency,
and the determinants of invoicing currency include exporter’s motive to limit output
volatility, hedge macroeconomic volatility, and reduce transaction cost. Most of their
hypotheses were verified in a novel dataset of 24 countries. Another approach is in
Goldberg and Tille (2013), where the choice of invoicing currency is solved in a Nash
bargaining game between exporter and importer, and the outcome is related with
elements of market structure such as fragmentation, heterogeneity, and risk tolerance.
For all its significance and excellency, invoicing currency model is not explicit about
the underlying process of currency circulation and exchange. Producer’s choice mainly
reflects uncertainty of demand and exchange rate. In addition, most of these models
are partial equilibrium, making it improper for welfare analysis and policy discussion.
2.3 Search model
Search theory is seemingly born to discuss the determinants of international currency,
with its inherent advantage in answering why fiat money circulates as medium of ex-
change. Earlier studies of first-generation theory employed two-country two-currency
model, but suffered from the indivisibility of output and money, as in Matsuyama
et al. (1993). Second-generation theory endogenized output by bargaining, as in
Trejos and Wright (1996), but still couldn’t reach equilibrium.
With the breakthrough in Lagos and Wright (2005), search theory is now widely
applied to topics in international macroeconomics. Geromichalos and Simonovska
(2014) built a two-country model with asset to explain home bias puzzle and interna-
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tional portfolio choice. Jung and Lee (2015) emphasized the role of liquidity premium
in accounting for Uncovered Interest Parity puzzle4. This paper is closest in spirit
to Zhang (2014), who used an information-based theory to discuss the determinants
of international currency and its implication for monetary policy, but my approach
is different in several aspects. First, there is an additional round of financial market
since exporter and importer rely on bank-intermediated finance for trade settlement.
Second, the cost of using a certain currency comes from the fixed cost in banking
sector, which is more tractable and realistic. This means home currency use is also
costly, so agents make a binary choice of using home or foreign currency, and distinct
currencies are no longer perfect substitutes. Lastly, the role of government is not ex-
plicitly stipulating home currency use. Instead, it would decide on whether to absorb
the initial cost of financial market and make its own currency international.
3 International trade finance
The timing of payment and delivery is always a big issue for international trade.
Without mutual trust or history record, the direct and bilateral trade between buyer
and seller would bring in a lot of uncertainty: buyers don’t know whether they could
get goods after payment, and sellers are not guaranteed that they would get paid
after delivery. According to the timing of payment and delivery, the pattern of trade
finance could be generally classified into three groups: Cash-in-advance (payment
before delivery), Open account (payment after delivery), and Bank trade finance. If
buyer and seller trust each other, cash-in-advance or open account would be a good
choice with a relatively low transaction cost. If sellers don’t trust buyer but believe
the credit of buyer’s bank, bank-intermediated trade finance would come into play.
Figure 1 gives a snapshot of the share of different trade finance around 2008.
It should be noted that there is no comprehensive measure of trade finance, and
4This class of model has a large concern on asset, which is usually supplied from Lucas tree. The
asset plays dual roles as store of value in its claim to future output, and medium of exchange in
acting as collateral to facilitate trade. My model is focused on fiat money as medium of exchange
so asset pricing only has minor, if not trivial, effect on equilibrium condition. Moreover, buyer is
assumed to get goods one period after contract, so he would never give asset to seller as payment
without further guarantee.
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most data in this field are either estimation or based on survey report. Despite the
limited data availability, it’s safe to conclude that bank trade finance is important in
facilitating international trade, although its contribution varies in different estima-
tion. For bank trade finance, the most important instrument is Letter of Credit (LC).
Committee on the Global Financial System (2014) estimated that bank trade finance
directly supports about one-third of global trade, with LC covering over half of bank
finance. International Chamber of Commerce (ICC, 2014) has a similar conclusion on
the importance of LC in bank trade finance: in 2013, the share of traditional commer-
cial LC in export and import trade finance is 41% and 36%. Not very surprisingly,
this number has a great variation across region and nation. ICC Banking Commission
(2014) reported that Europe and North America used more of Document Collection
(DC), while Asia-Pacific countries heavily rely on LC, covering 75% and 68% of their
export and import bank trade finance. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014) em-
pirically studied LC in United States, finding that LC only covers 8.8% of U.S. export
in 2012, though with different degrees across country and industry, varying between
0 and 90%. For example, 30% of U.S. export to China is financed by LC. According
to Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014), the use of LC is highly correlated with
contract environment and rule of law: LC is mostly employed for exports to countries
with intermediate degrees of contract enforcement. It is also used for riskier destina-
tions than DC. In short, LC plays an important role in trade finance, especially for
developing and Asia-Pacific countries.
3.1 Letter of credit step by step
Figure 2 shows the working mechanism of LC. The following step of LC is in order.
Step 1 Exporter and importer determine terms of trade and sign business contract.
Step 2 Importer would go to issuing bank, show the contract, and apply for LC. The
issuing bank usually asks for a certain amount of collateral from importer before
LC is issued.
Letter of credit is “a commitment by a bank on behalf of the buyer that payment
would be made to the beneficiary provided that the terms and conditions stated
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in LC has been met, consisting of the presentation of specified documents” (US
department of commerce). The issuing bank would make payment only a certain
days after shipment, and that’s the maturity of LC, usually around 3 months.
Step 3 The issuing bank would send LC to advising bank for scrutiny.
Step 4 After checking details, advising bank would notify exporter so that he could
prepare shipment.
Step 5 Exporter makes shipment and gets the required document, especially bill of
lading (B/L).
Bill of lading is a document issued by carrier which details a shipment of mer-
chandise and gives title of that shipment to a specified party, usually its holder.
Step 6 Exporter sends required document to advising bank for payment.
Step 7 After checking the required document, advising bank would notify the issuing
bank. In principle, exporter needs to wait until maturity of LC, but he is usually
in urgent need of liquidity, so advising bank would make payment to exporter
at discount.
Step 8 The principle of “borrow short and lend long” makes advising bank unwilling
to hold LC, given its short maturity. Advising bank would sell combine LC
and other required documents as trade acceptance and sell it to any interested
parties.
The set of documents including LC and B/L is referred to as trade acceptance
or banker’s acceptance, whose payment is guaranteed by both issuing bank and
advising bank, making it attractive for short-term investment.
Step 9 Upon maturity, anyone holding trade acceptance could go to issuing bank for
payment. After checking the required document, issuing bank would notify
importer. The importer then makes payment and gets shipment.
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Several comments on LC. First, it’s obvious from the elaborate description that
issuing LC is quite labor-intensive and incurs a large fixed cost for bank, which is
confirmed in Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014) reporting that the top 5 US
bank accounted for more than 92% of LC claims. Second, buyer would not want to
default in this contract environment since that would deny his ownership of shipment.
The actual default rate of LC reported in ICC Banking Commission (2014) is 0.033%
for export and 0.117% for import. Lastly, the currency denominating LC should
have a liquid financial market and low transaction cost so that sellers could be easily
financed. Actually US dollar is still the dominant currency in LC, making up 82% of
total value (ICC Banking Commission, 2014), but the recent rise-up of RMB is also
noteworthy, compromising around 9% of total value.
4 The Model
4.1 Environment
Time is discrete and infinite. There are two countries in the world, 1 and 2, each
populated with a unit measure of buyer, seller, and investor, who live forever with
a discount factor of β ∈ (0, 1). Their identity is fixed over time and their respective
population is σ, σ, and (1− 2σ). In addition, each country has a perfect competitive
banking sector. Each period is divided into three rounds of centralized market (CM),
decentralized market (DM), and financial market (FM). There is divisible and storable
fiat money circulating in each country, and its total supply evolves according to
Mˆi = (1 + µi)Mi, where Mi is the stock of country i’s fiat money in current period,
and variable with a hat is the level in next period. The growth rate of money supply,
µi, is under the control of central bank.
Here I start with brief introduction on model, and a formal description would
follow. In DM, sellers are specialized in the production of a perishable differentiated
good q but unable to consume it, while buyers are able to consume but couldn’t pro-
duce. Due to imperfect credit and lack of record, a medium of exchange is necessary.
Moreover, q is delivered only at the beginning of next period. Assume domestic agents
know each other very well so they agree on the use of open account for settlement,
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whereas agents from different countries don’t trust each other, so settlement is fa-
cilitated by bank-intermediated finance. For international trade, buyers ask bank to
issue LC, and sellers get immediate liquidity from bank after showing required doc-
ument of shipment. In FM, only investors could purchase trade acceptance, which
is a one-period nominal bond issued by bank, with a total payoff equal to buyer’s
future payment. At the beginning of next period, buyers make payment to get q, and
investors receive payoff for their holding of trade acceptance. In the following CM,
buyer, seller, and investor engage in the production of a perishable nume´raire good
X and adjust their holdings of fiat money. The timing of model is depicted in figure
3.
Now I will begin to formalize the setup of physical environment. For tractabil-
ity, assume the instantaneous utility function for buyer, seller, and investor in two
countries is the following
UB = u(q) + U(X)−H
US = −c(q) + U(X)−H
U I = U(X)−H
where q, X, and H capture the amount of specialized good, nume´raire good, and work-
ing hour. While every agent could produce nume´raire good with a linear technology
of X = H, only sellers could produce differentiated good at the cost of c(q). It’s
further assumed that the optimal consumption in CM is X∗, such that U ′(X∗) = 1.
The conventional assumption on function form also holds, so u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(0) =
+∞, c′(0) = 0, u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. For notations below, i = {1, 2},
j = {1, 2} 6= i. The real value of country i’s fiat money in terms of nume´raire good
is φi. This model is focused on stationary monetary equilibrium where the aggregate
real balance is constant, therefore 1 + µi =
φi
φˆi
. Central banks adjust home currency
supply through lump-sum transfer to domestic agent when CM opens.
There is separate DM in each country. Buyers could go abroad with a probability
of (1− α) while sellers stay at home. Buyer and seller meet pairwise and at random,
with a matching function ofNi =
BiSi
Bi+Si
, whereNi is the number of successful matching
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in country i, with Bi and Si for the number of buyer and seller in country i’s DM.
With this matching function, the number of meeting between country i buyer and
country j seller (nij), as well as the probability for country i buyer to meet country
j seller (pij) could be determined. DM in this model functions as international trade
market. FM is segmented by capital control. The banking sector in country i could
issue LC denominated in its home currency. The total cost (Fi) is assumed to be
fixed to reflect economy of scale. Fi is also a proxy for financial development. FM in
this model represents financial market for short-term investment.
In contrast, CM is open to buyer, seller, and investor from both countries. This
Walrasian market allows agents to adjust their holding of home and foreign currency,
so it’s similar to a frictionless foreign exchange market5. Additionally, since central
bank’s lump-sum transfer is only for domestic agents, extracting seigniorage revenue
through inflation is possible only when a certain currency is demanded by foreigners.
The currency regime is endogenized by seller’s binary choice of settlement currency
6. If financial frictions make international trade unprofitable, international currency
would never emerge. Otherwise, sellers would choose whichever currency that brings
a higher level of profit.
4.2 Optimal choice and equilibrium
4.2.1 CM Value function
Agent’s CM value function differs according to his type. For buyer, he would want to
hold money at the end of CM to enjoy differentiated good in next period, therefore
5This is certainly not without loss of generality, as discussed in Geromichalos and Jung (2015)
6Here I assume away the possibility that sellers accept both currencies at the same time, for
two reasons. First, that doesn’t happen very often in reality, given that LC is mostly issued in a
single currency. Second, this assumption makes model tractable in the case of indeterminacy. In
my model, sellers would choose home currency if both currencies bring the same level of positive
profit. In Zhang (2014), accepting home currency doesn’t incur additional information cost for seller,
so accepting both currencies is possible. In this model, accepting home currency is also costly for
international trade, so sellers would choose a single currency for settlement.
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the CM maximization problem for buyer in country i is
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j ,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]
s.t. φimˆ
i
i + φjmˆ
i
j +X ≤ H + φimii + φjmij + Ti
where mij is country i buyer’s holding of country j currency; V
B
i is country i buyer’s
value function for DM trade; Ti is the lump-sum transfer from country i central bank.
This CM value function could be simplified as
WBi = U(X)−X + φimii + φjmij + Ti + max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
βE[V Bi (φˆimˆii, φˆjmˆij)]− φimˆii − φjmˆij
}
With the observation that buyer’s value function is linear in his holding of money,
further simplify this into
WBi (φim
i
i, φjm
i
j) = W
B
i (0, 0) + φim
i
i + φjm
i
j
For sellers, they don’t have any incentive to hold money in CM since the liquidity he
would get from bank is irrelevant with his holding of money. So CM value function
for seller is constant with respect to his own money holding.
With similar notations, the CM value function for country i investor is
W Ii (zi) = max
zˆi,aˆi,H,X
U(X)−H + βE[V Ii (zˆi, aˆi)]
s.t. φizˆi +X ≤ H + φizi + Ti
where V Ii (mˆi, aˆi) is the value function for investor in financial market, related with his
holding of home currency (zˆi) and trade acceptance (aˆi) for next period. Similarly,
this value function could be simplified into
W Ii (zi) = W
I
i (0) + φizi
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4.2.2 Terms of trade in DM
Buyer and seller make a proportional bargaining in DM to determine terms of trade.
Buyer’s utility maximization problem is
max
q,d(m)
{u(q)− φd(m)}
s.t. u(q)−φd(m)
φd(m)− c(q)
β
= θ
1−θ
d(m) ≤ m
where q is the amount of differentiated good sellers would produce; d(m) is the amount
of fiat money buyers would pay to sellers; θ is buyer’s bargaining power. Since buyers
make payment only when q is delivered at the beginning of next period, seller’s surplus
is adjusted by discount factor. The solution is
d(m) =
m∗ if φm >
c(q∗)
β
m if φm ≤ c(q∗)
β
where q∗ is the level of consumption that would maximize total surplus such that
βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗); m∗ is buyer’s payment when total surplus is maximized, so φm∗ =
(1− θ)u(q∗) + θ c(q∗)
β
. It will become clear in equilibrium that buyer’s holding of fiat
money would never exceed m∗, because excessive money doesn’t increase his gains
from trade, but would incur a loss from inflation. Therefore, buyer’s payment to seller
is φm = (1− θ)u(q) + θ c(q)
β
, with q ≤ q∗, βu′(q∗) = c′(q∗).
4.2.3 Investor decision in FM
Country i investor’s profit maximization problem in FM is
max
ai
{zi + (yi − pi)ai}
s.t. piai ≤ zi
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where pi and yi are nominal price and payoff of trade acceptance issued by country
i’s banking sector. Notice that investor is risk-neutral since his CM value function is
linear in z, so he would only want to maximize his expected level of wealth. Individual
investor’s demand for trade acceptance is
ai =
0 if yi < pizi/pi if yi ≥ pi
This result is intuitive: if the payoff is lower than cost, investor’s demand would be
zero. For country i investor, the total demand for trade acceptance is D = (1− 2σ)ai
. The total payoff of trade acceptance in country i should be equal to buyer’s total
payment for international trade settled in country i currency, so the total supply of
trade acceptance is S =
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
yi
.
At equilibrium, if trade acceptance is attractive to investor, its payoff must be no
less than price, so yi
pi
=
sinjim
j
i+(1−sj)nijmii
(1−2σ)zi ≥ 1.
4.2.4 Financial constraint and seller’s decision
More importantly, the addition of bank and investor imposed financial constraint for
monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade. The immediate liquidity
provided by bank must be able to cover seller’s DM cost. Given a perfect competitive
banking sector, zero profit condition holds, so this immediate liquidity is equal to
the proceedings from selling trade acceptance, net of banking sector’s fixed cost.
Consequently, country i seller’s gain from international trade settled in home currency
is
pii ≡
[
1− Fi
(1− 2σ)φizi
](
1
1 +Ri
)
φim
j
i − c(qji )
where Ri ≡ φiβφˆi − 1 is the nominal interest rate of country i, and q
j
i is country j
buyer’s purchase of differentiated good settled in country i currency.
From this result, seller’s revenue in DM trade is affected by three factors. First,
terms of trade from proportional bargaining, φim
j
i . Second, discount factor of (1 +
Ri)
−1. Finally, financial friction influenced by the fixed cost of banking sector (Fi)
and financial market liquidity of (1 − 2σ)φizi. Intuitively, fixed cost is negatively
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correlated with seller’s revenue, while an increase of financial market liquidity could
help improve seller’s profit from DM trade.
As shown later, inflation has negative impact on these factors at the same time.
For terms of trade, higher inflation would reduce buyer’s trade volume and real bal-
ance holding; for discount factor, it erodes the value of future payment; for financial
friction, it tends to depress investor’s confidence, thus lowering their purchase of trade
acceptance. In short, higher inflation would get amplified by financial market and
hugely deteriorate exporter’s welfare.
Similarly, country i seller’s profit from international trade settled in foreign cur-
rency is
pi∗i ≡
[
1− Fj
(1− 2σ)φjzj
](
1
1 +Rj
)
φjm
j
j − c(qjj )
With these in mind, country i sellers choose settlement currency7.
autarky if max{pii, pi∗i } < 0
si = 1 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii ≥ pi∗i
si = 0 if max{pii, pi∗i } ≥ 0, pii < pi∗i
(1)
Finally, currency regime comes from seller’s decision. If {s1, s2} = {1, 0} or {0, 1},
there’s a single international currency, which case referred to as hegemony from now;
if {s1, s2} = {1, 1}, both currencies become international, and seller would use home
currency for trade settlement, which is producer currency pricing (PCP); if {s1, s2} =
{0, 0}, there are two international currencies, and international trade is settled by
importer’s home currency, which is local currency pricing (LCP). Currency regime is
summarized in table 2.
7Here I didn’t consider the asymmetric case when international trade is profitable for country i
seller but not for country j seller, just for the sake of simplicity. It’s quite easy to include that case
and related discussion would be straightforward.
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4.2.5 Optimal choice for buyer and investor
For buyer and investor, the optimal holding of real balance is available after combining
CM and DM value function. For country i buyer, his DM value function is
V Bi =
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
+ pijsj
(
u(qij)− φjmij
)
+WBi
where (pii + (1− sj)pij
)(
u(qii)− φimii
)
is country i buyer’s expected surplus for DM
trade settled in country i currency, while pijsj
(
u(qij)− φjmij
)
is his expected surplus
for trade settled in country j currency.
Substitute this into the expression of buyer’s CM value function, then his maxi-
mization problem becomes
max
mˆii,mˆ
i
j
{
(βφˆi − φi)mˆii + β
(
pii + (1− sj)pij
)
θ
[
u(qˆii)−
c(qˆii)
β
]
+(βφˆj − φj)mˆij + βsjpijθ
[
u(qˆij)−
c(qˆij)
β
]}
Several conventional observation in monetary search model would also apply here.
For example, the solution for maximization problem requires βφˆi−φi < 0 andm < m∗.
The first order condition for home currency is
Ri = (pii + (1− sj)pij)
[
θ(u′(qii)− c′(qii)/β)
(1− θ)u′(qii) + θc′(qii)/β
]
(2)
This first order condition means buyer’s marginal cost of holding money (Ri)
must be equal to the expected marginal benefit. Notice that buyer’s demand for
home currency is positive since his meeting with domestic sellers would always use
home currency as medium of exchange. This is not true for foreign currency, which
depends on foreign seller’s decision.
qij = 0 if sj = 0
Rj = pij
[
θ(u′(qij)−c′(qij)/β)
(1−θ)u′(qij)+θc′(qij)/β
]
if sj = 1
(3)
16
For simplicity, define L(q) ≡ θ(u′(q)−c′(q)/β)
(1−θ)u′(q)+θc′(q)/β as liquidity premium. Apply the same
procedure to investor’s maximization problem, and combine the first order condition
with equilibrium level of yi/pi, I could get investor’s optimal holding of home currency.
zi = 0 if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
Ri =
sinjiφim
j
i+(1−sj)nijφimii
(1−2σ)φizi − 1, otherwise
(4)
This result is also intuitive: if home currency never became international, investor
wouldn’t hold any of that; otherwise, investor’s marginal cost of holding home cur-
rency should be equal to the rate of return from trade acceptance.
Lastly, money market should clear after agents make choice. Consider the case
when international trade is profitable. ∀i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j
σφim
i
i = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 1}
σφim
i
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {0, 0}
σφim
i
i + σφim
j
i + (1− 2σ)φizi + Fi = φiMi if {si, sj} = {1, 0}, {1, 1}
(5)
For the first case, country i currency remains national, so its demand comes from
only domestic buyer. For the second case of LCP, its demand comes from home
buyer, home investor, and banking sector. For the last case, home buyer, home
investor, foreign buyer, and banking sector would all demand for country i currency.
4.2.6 Monetary equilibrium of international trade
With agent’s optimal choice, now it’s possible to define a stationary monetary equi-
librium. My main concern is the emergence of international currency, so I would focus
on the equilibrium that allows for international trade.
Definition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium that allows for international trade
is a list of time-invariant values including trade volume {qij}2i,j=1, investor’s holding
of real balance {φizi}2i=1, and seller’s choice of settlement currency {si}2i=1 such that,
given other agent’s behavior,
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1. Seller’s choice of {si}2i=1 solves (1);
2. Buyer’s choice of {qij}2i,j=1 solves (2)(3);
3. Investor’s choice of {φizi}2i=1 solves (4);
4. Money market clears so that (5) holds.
4.3 Hegemony and incumbency advantage
Now consider the case of hegemony when country 1 currency becomes international
while country 2 currency remains national (s1 = 1, s2 = 0). Could 1 would be re-
ferred to as center country while country 2 as peripheral country. Intuitively, country
1 buyer would never hold foreign currency since his home currency is universally ac-
knowledged and appreciated. In contrast, country 2 buyer would hold home currency
for domestic trade and foreign currency for international trade. Moreover, the single
international currency makes financial market active only in country 1. Consistent
with definition 1, equilibrium condition is explicitly shown in appendix. There is in-
cumbency advantage of country 1 in this international monetary system. Due to the
economy of scale in banking sector, country 2 currency would never become interna-
tional without collective action, government promotion, or a sudden shock that drains
financial market liquidity in country 1. This observation is reflected in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If country 1 currency is the only international currency, an in-
dividual seller would never use country 2 currency for international trade settlement.
Proof In this case, country 2 seller couldn’t ask country 1 buyer to pay coun-
try 2 currency since neither buyer or investor in country 1 holds foreign currency. For
country 1 seller, if he accepted country 2 currency for trade settlement, his profit is
pi∗1 ≤  (1− θ)
[
u(q12)− c(q12)/β
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
DM surplus for seller
−F2,
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where  is the number of seller trying to accept country 2 currency. If  is not
sufficiently large relative to F2, seller’s profit would be negative thanks to the fixed
cost in the banking sector of country 2.
Notice the difference between this incumbency advantage and the size effect em-
phasized by classical literature. Previous studies often argued that the size effect
of large economy would help lower the transaction cost of its currency in foreign
exchange market, therefore justifying its status of international currency. But propo-
sition 1 shows that economy size alone is not enough. Financial development proves
indispensable.
This situation of hysteresis leaves room for policy intervention. Government could
promote the internationalization of its currency by decreasing F through financial
reform or deregulation. Another possibility is for central bank to absorb financial
friction by becoming market maker. In history, federal reserve took advantage of
both options after 1913, and the rise-up of US dollar was largely attributed to that,
as vividly described in Eichengreen (2011).
4.4 Monetary policy and international trade
With definition 1, the equilibrium condition for hegemony, PCP, and LCP could be
outlined, and comparative statics on monetary policy become possible. On the part
of domestic trade, monetary policy has uniform effect on agent’s welfare level: higher
inflation tends to reduce their gains from trade. On the part of investor, it’s also easy
to show that higher inflation level erodes confidence and drives down financial mar-
ket liquidity. The effect of monetary policy on international trade, however, differs
according to currency regimes, as shown in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Under some general assumptions, higher inflation of international
currency would hurt whoever used it for trade settlement.
(i) For hegemony, higher inflation of international currency would hurt importer and
exporter from both countries, i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0, ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
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(ii) For PCP, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home exporter
and foreign importer, i.e., ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0,
∂q21
∂R1
< 0.
(iii) For LCP, higher inflation of international currency would hurt home importer
and foreign exporter,i.e.,
∂q11
∂R1
< 0,
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0.
Proof in appendix
One interesting observation from proposition 2 is the relationship between nomi-
nal exchange rate and net export. This model is quite silent on exchange rate partly
because, as shown in proposition 1, it’s the incumbency advantage and financial de-
velopment that determines the emergence of international currency. A discussion on
monetary policy and international trade, however, necessitates the inclusion of ex-
change rate. In particular, the possibility of ‘beggar thy neighbor’ through nominal
depreciation would influence the conduct of monetary policy. Now assume Law of
One Price (LOP) for nume´raire good holds in this model, and nominal exchange rate
is ei/j ≡ φjφi , where ei/j is the nominal exchange rate of country i currency per country
j currency. Given that φi = (1 + µi)φˆi in stationary monetary equilibrium, a higher
inflation level of home currency would lead to nominal depreciation, whose effect on
international trade differs according to currency regime.
For hegemony, the result is unclear and contingent on parameter value. For PCP,
higher inflation and home currency depreciation would hurt home exporter and foreign
importer, thus lowering home export and net export, given that home import is
insulated from this shock. For LCP, home currency depreciation would hurt home
importer and foreign exporter, thus lowering home import and increasing home net
export. Therefore, in this model, ‘beggar thy neighbor’ through nominal depreciation
is possible in LCP, impossible in PCP, and uncertain in hegemony. These observations
are summarized in table 3. Of course, the conduct of monetary policy is over-simplified
in model. In reality, a sterilized FX intervention could depreciate home currency and
stabilize money supply at the same time. A more elaborate model is required for
in-depth discussion.
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4.5 Welfare analysis and optimal monetary policy
A prominent advantage of monetary search model is the tractability of agent’s asset
holding and welfare level, which is important for the conduct of optimal monetary
policy if central bank is assumed to maximize the social welfare of its own country.
In this model, social welfare consists of seigniorage revenue, gains from trade, and a
loss from banking sector’s fixed cost if this country issues international currency. For
simplicity, additional welfare gain from consuming nume´raire good is omitted.
If country 1 issues the only international currency, for example, social welfare level
at the end of each period is the following.
W1 = µ1σφ1m
2
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =− µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
With similar procedure, the welfare level for PCP and LCP is shown in appendix.
From previous assumptions and proposition 2, each country’s gain from interna-
tional trade is decreasing in the nominal interest rate of international currency. For
seigniorage revenue, recall that central bank’s lump-sum transfer is only applied to
domestic agent, and other agents need to purchase that currency in CM. Therefore,
seigniorage revenue is possible only when there’s foreign demand for that country’s
currency. Without loss of generality, assume seigniorage revenue is increasing in the
growth rate of money supply, which gives incentive to deviate from Friedman rule.
Seigniorage revenue would cancel out in the summation of each country’s welfare,
so Friedman rule is optimal for a social planner trying to maximize total welfare. In
addition, it’s inefficient to issue two international currencies since that would incur
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fixed cost of banking sector in both countries. Social planner would let a country
with lower F issue a single international currency. For each country aimed at maxi-
mizing its own welfare, Friedman rule is not optimal if there’s foreign demand of its
currency, which includes the case of PCP and hegemony when a country issues the
only international currency. These observations are summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 In a stationary monetary equilibrium with international trade,
Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rate is not always optimal.
1. For social planner trying to maximize total welfare, Friedman rule is optimal,
and countries with higher degree of financial development would issue international
currency.
2. For central bank trying to maximize the social welfare of its own country, Friedman
rule is not optimal when there’s is foreign demand of its currency.
Figure 4 is shows the second case of central bank faced with a trade off between
seigniorage revenue and gains from trade. It plots the relationship between nom-
inal interest rate and the welfare level of a country that issues the only interna-
tional currency. The function form is borrowed from Lagos and Wright (2005) with
u(q) = ln(q + b)− ln(q), c(q) = q, b = 0.0001. The rest of parameter value is shown
in table 4. Friedman rule is clearly not optimal, since the welfare level is maximized
around 16% of nominal interest rate. Also, the status of international currency would
be lost if nominal interest rate is raised above 25%, putting a limit central bank’s
conduct of monetary policy, which has been intensively discussed in Zhang (2014).
One interpretation of proposition 3 is to regard international currency as pub-
lic good, in the spirit of Kindleberger (1986). Center country makes investment in
banking sector and financial institution to facilitate trade. Peripheral country takes
advantage of international currency as well as the system of payment and settlement.
Seigniorage revenue conveys negative externality since center country tends to inflate
and overproduce international currency, and that would hurt the rest of world. For a
social planner, that externality is internalized and canceled out, retaining Friedman
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rule as the optimal monetary policy.
5 Discussion of related topic
5.1 Size effect
Classical and recent literature uniformly favored large economy as provider of inter-
national currency due to size effect. For example, Devereux and Shi (2013) built a
DSGE model for quantitative analysis, and concluded that large country is in a good
position to provide international currency, since large trade volume would reduce
transaction cost in FX market. In what follows I would use a numerical example to
re-evaluate this issue.
In my model, economy size is approximated by national population, i.e., the total
number of buyer, seller, and investor. A change in population would, according
to matching function, directly influence the number and probability of the meeting
between buyer and seller, thus affecting equilibrium outcome. Figure 5 shows the
relationship for center country’s population and its optimal nominal interest rate.
Parameter value and function forms are identical to those in figure 4. Center country’s
population is ranged from 0.1 to 10, while peripheral country’s population stays at
1. A hump-shape is surprising at first sight, but the composition of center country’s
welfare in figure 6 demystifies everything. In essence, size effect alters the degree of
trade-off between seigniorage revenue and gains from trade. For a large economy,
gains from domestic trade dominate its total welfare, so higher inflation is not a
good choice. Similarly, gains from international trade compromise the biggest part of
welfare for a small open economy, reducing the attractiveness of reaping seigniorage
revenue. It’s therefore reasonable to think of figure 5 as a continuation of proposition
3 in exploration of center country’s optimal monetary policy. Size effect is crucial
here not because of its absolute value, but in affecting the desirability of seigniorage
revenue: if gains from trade loom larger and larger from size effect, convergence to
Friedman rule becomes a better choice. In other words, it is the structure of economy,
the share of trade in its total welfare, that determines whether a country is qualified
as natural provider of international currency.
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To summarize, hegemony is reasonable for a unipolar world dominated by eco-
nomic superpower, while multiple international currencies make sense in a multipolar
world with evenly distributed economy size.
5.2 Global imbalance
The 2008 financial crisis brought into attention the huge current account deficit of
United States, known as global imbalance now. Many studies regard it as transi-
tory phenomenon due to the saving glut of Asian countries (Bernanke, 2005) or the
monetary policies of United states and exchange rate policy of emerging countries
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). My model of international currency, however, illustrates
that global imbalance is a sustainable and structural symptom arising from the ar-
rangement of monetary system. If there’s only a single international currency, the
center country would have trade deficit at equilibrium in a perfect symmetric model,
whereas multiple international currencies would help reduce this global imbalance.
Now consider a perfect symmetric two country model where both countries are
identical in size, openness, and monetary policy, so that n12 = n21, p12 = p21, p11 =
p22, R1 = R2 > 0. If country 1 issues the only international currency, equilibrium
condition indicates
R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q
1
1) = p21L(q
2
1),
which naturally leads to the observation that q11 > q
2
1, given p11 + p12 > p21 and
L′(q) < 0. From terms of trade, φm = (1−θ)u(q)+θ c(q)
β
, so φ1m
1
1 > φ1m
2
1. Intuitively,
country 1 buyer would hold more real balance of country 1 currency since he expects
a higher chance of meeting with home or foreign seller, while country 2 buyer would
hold less real balance of international currency since his trade with home sellers is
still settled in country 2 currency. The trade balance for country 1 is therefore
TB1 ≡ EX1 − IM1 = n21q21 − n12q11 < 0.
Obviously, even in a perfect symmetric model, the single issuing country of inter-
national currency would have persistent trade deficit, which doesn’t hold for other
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currency regimes. In PCP, R1 = p11L(q11) = p21L(q21)R2 = p12L(q12) = p22L(q22)
With q21 = q
1
2, trade balance of both countries is zero. Similarly for LCPR1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11)R2 = (p22 + p21)L(q22)
With q11 = q
2
2, trade balance is also zero for both countries. This finding echoes Liu
and Zhou (2015), who built a DSGE model to show the sustainability of US current
account deficit resulting from the status of dollar as an international currency8.
It should be cautioned here this model doesn’t provide any normative analysis
on global imbalance, since agents would always benefit from international trade, ir-
relevant with current account surplus or deficit. So this application only states that
a system of multiple international currencies is desirable if global imbalance proves
problematic.
The case of asymmetric model is complicated and sensitive to parameter value. For
simplicity, the following discussion is limited to the case of hegemony where country
1 issues the only international currency. First consider the effect of monetary policy.
Differentiate the trade balance of country 1 with respect to the nominal interest rate
of country 1, and the result follows.
∂TB1
∂R1
=
1
R1
[
EX1
L(q21)
− IM1
L(q11)
]
, L(q) ≡ ∂L
∂q
q
L
From this, the effect of monetary policy on current account is crucially dependent on
the elasticity of liquidity premium and trade volume: if EX1
L(q
2
1)
> IM1
L(q
1
1)
, higher level of
8The mechanism of their model is quite different from mine. Like most invoicing currency model,
they presumed CIA to introduce fiat money. US dollar is also exogenously assumed to be the only
international currency. US trade deficit is determined by foreign demand of dollar. With positive
long-run growth of global economy, there would be a structural global imbalance, whose magnitude
is affected by the degree of openness, substitution elasticity between home and foreign goods, and
the relative size of US economy to the rest of world.
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interest rate would deteriorate center country’s current account, otherwise inflation
would help reduce global imbalance. Next consider country size effect, illustrated in
figure 7 and 8 with numerical example. Both figures plot the relationship between
the population and current account of the country that issues the only international
currency. The function form and parameter value still follows those in table 4, with
the only exception of α that represents the degree of integration. The level of nominal
interest rate is welfare-maximizing. With a high level of integration, as in figure 7,
there’s no monotone relationship between country size and trade balance, whereas
global balance deepened with population when integration is relatively high.
5.3 International vehicle currency
The model could be easily extended into N-country case to account for the emergence
of IVC. Model details and equilibrium conditions are derived in appendix for 3-country
model. Here I would show a main finding from model implication: sellers in different
countries would choose the same settlement currency for the export to a certain
country, as long as they are identical in bargaining power and cost function. In other
words, sellers display herding behavior in their choice of settlement currency.
Consider country j seller’s profit from trade with country i buyer, settled in country
k currency, and its expression follows.
pikij =
(
1− Fk
(1− 2σ)φkzk
)
1
1 +Rk
φkm
i
k − cj(qik)
Notice that seller’s feature would influence only terms of trade and cost function:
higher level of bargaining power brings in better terms of trade, and efficient produc-
tion improves profitability. If sellers are identical in these two aspects, their profit
would be equal for the export to a certain country, which leads to the rise of a common
IVC to reduce financial friction. Therefore, exporter of commodity or homogeneous
good would choose the same currency for settlement, which is consistent with em-
pirical literature. Goldberg and Tille (2008) showed that US dollar is the dominant
invoicing currency for the international trade of commodity and homogeneous goods9.
9Their explanation for this phenomenon is different. They argued that commodity price shows
excessive volatility, and IVC is used to reduce exchange rate risk.
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6 Concluding remarks
China has been trying to internationalize RMB since great recession, and several
measures are taken to accelerate this process, including currency swap agreement,
offshore market development, cross-border trade settlement, and capital account lib-
eralization. Among these, trade settlement is a natural starting point given China’s
leading role in international trade of merchandise. In contrast to traditional view
of thick market externality and natural monopoly, recent findings highlight the im-
portance of a deep and liquid financial market. To provide micro-foundation for
such observation, I incorporated financial frictions into the monetary search model in
Zhang (2014). This illustrative model also emphasized government’s role in taking
initiative to foster market, and explored the conduct of monetary policy in different
regimes. For future research, modeling financial market in a more meaningful way is
desirable to discuss asset pricing as well as the impact of capital account liberalization.
China’s recent campaign of helping RMB join SDR basket reaffirmed its grand
plan of financial reform and deregulation, although the outcome of such bold action
remains uncertain, especially given the recent chaos in stock market. A monetary
system with multiple international currencies is beneficial to United States, who has
been long accused of exorbitant privilege, as well as peripheral countries often crit-
icized for excessive reserve accumulation. Whether RMB is a qualified candidate in
this race to new world, we shall wait and see.
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A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium condition of different currency regimes
According to definition 1, the equilibrium condition for country 1 currency to emerge
as the single international currency is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) = p21L(q21) (1.1)R2 = p22L(q22) (1.2)
For seller 
pi1 =
[
1− F1
(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21) > 0 (1.3)
pi∗2 =
[
1− F1
(1−2σ)φ1z1
](
1
1+R1
)
φ1m
1
1 − c(q11) > 0 (1.4)
For investor
R1 =
n1,2φ1m
1
1 + n2,1φ1m
2
1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (1.5)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (1.6)σφ2m22 = φ2M2 (1.7)
If equations (1.1)-(1.8) are satisfied at the same time, country 1 currency would
emerge as the only international currency. Similarly, the equilibrium condition for
PCP is the following.
For buyer R1 = p11L(q11) = p21L(q21) (2.1.1)R2 = p12L(q12) = p22L(q22) (2.1.2)
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For seller pi1 > 0, pi1 > pi∗1 (2.1.3)pi2 > 0, pi2 > pi∗2 (2.1.4)
For investor R1 =
n21φ1q21
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.1.5)
R2 =
n12φ2q12
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.1.6)
For money marketσφ1m11 + σφ1m21 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.1.7)σφ2m22 + σφ2m12 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.1.8)
For LCP, equilibrium condition is the following.
For buyer R1 = (p11 + p12)L(q11) (2.2.1)R2 = (p22 + p21)L(q22) (2.2.2)
For seller pi∗1 > 0 (2.2.3)pi∗2 > 0 (2.2.4)
For investor R1 =
n12φ1q11
(1−2σ)φ1z1 − 1 (2.2.5)
R2 =
n21φ2q22
(1−2σ)φ2z2 − 1 (2.2.6)
For money marketσφ1m11 + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (2.2.7)σφ2m22 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (2.2.8)
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A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Most of this proof is straightforward except the part of exporter’s gain from interna-
tional trade, which requires additional assumption on function form.
Lemma 1 If exporter’s financial loss is more sensitive than DM cost function in
response to interest rate shock, i.e., (f + c) > 0 , exporter’s gain from international
trade is decreasing in nominal interest rate, i.e., ∂pi
∂R
< 0.
Proof Let βE ≡ (1 − F
(1−2σ)φz )(1 + R)
−1 denote the effective discount factor for
seller. Without loss of generality, assume βE < β so that financial friction would re-
duce seller’s gain from trade. Therefore, (β−βE) > 0 is a measure of seller’s financial
loss. Combine the expression of buyer’s payment in DM and seller’s profit in section
(3.2.4), I could get
pi = βE(1− θ)
[
u(q)− c(q)
β
]
− 1
β
(β − βE)c(q).
Given that ∂φz
∂R
< 0, it’s easy to find that ∂β
E
∂R
< 0. With the previous condition in
proportional bargaining, q < q∗, u′(q∗) = c′(q∗)
β
, u′ < 0, c′ > 0, the first item is
decreased in R.
For the second item, differentiate with respect to R, I could get cf
βR
(f + c), where
f ≡ (β−βE) captures the degree of seller’s financial loss, f ≡ ∂f∂R Rf is the elasticity of
financial loss on nominal interest rate. Similarly, c is the elasticity of seller’s DM cost
in response to interest rate shock. Obviously, f > 0, c < 0. A sufficient condition
for ∂pi
∂R
< 0 is f + c > 0. Therefore, as long as financial loss is more sensitive to the
change of nominal interest rate, higher inflation level would decrease exporter’s gain
from international trade.
Another helpful observation is the property of buyer’s liquidity premium. Recall
its definition.
L(q) ≡ θ(u
′(q)− c′(q)
β
)
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ c′(q)
β
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Take differentiation with respect to q, I could get the following result.
L′(q) =
θ
β
[
(1− θ)u′(q) + θ
β
c′(q)
]−2
(u′′c′ − u′c′′)
With previous assumption on function form, u′ > 0, c′ > 0, u′′ < 0, c′′ > 0, it’s obvious
that L′(q) < 0, so buyer’s liquidity premium is decreasing in his trade volume. After
these preparations, now it’s easy to prove proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
On the part of exporters, assume f + c > 0 always holds.
For single international currency
∂q11
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))
−1 < 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))
−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
For PCP 
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q21
∂R1
= (p21L
′(q21))
−1 < 0
 ∂pi1∂R1 < 0∂pi2
∂R1
= 0
For LCP 
∂q12
∂R1
= ((p11 + p12)L
′(q11))
−1 < 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0

∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
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A.2.1 Welfare level
For PCP, the welfare level is the following.
W1 =µ1σφ1m
2
1 − µ2σφ2m12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seigniorage revenue
+n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q12)− c(q12)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ1m
2
1 − c(q21)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =µ2σφ2m
1
2 − µ1σφ1m21 + n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q21)− c(q21)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
1
2 − c(q12)
}
− F2
For LCP, welfare level is the following.
W1 =n11
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
domestic trade surplus
+n12θ
[
βu(q11)− c(q11)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer surplus
+ n21
{[
1− F2
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]( 1
1 +R2
)
φ2m
2
2 − c(q22)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter surplus
−F1
W2 =n22
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n21θ
[
βu(q22)− c(q22)
]
+ n12
{[
1− F1
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]( 1
1 +R1
)
φ2m
1
1 − c(q11)
}
− F2
A.3 Three-country model
The potential payment system in three-country model is quite numerous, and this
part is concerned about the rise of international vehicle currency (IVC), which is used
to settle trade between non-issuing countries. The assumption in two-country model
could be easily applied here, requiring only minor change of notation. ∀i, j, k ∈ 1, 2, 3,
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pij is the probability of successful matching between country i buyer and country j
seller; nij is the corresponding number of meeting; q
i
j is country i buyer’s holding of
country j currency; pikij is country j seller’s profit from his trade with country i buyer,
settled in country k currency. Most importantly, here I assume sellers in different
countries are identical in bargaining power and cost function, so that the consistency
from proposition 4 would hold. For simplicity, the following discussion covers only
the case of single and double international currency.
A.3.1 Single dominance
Now consider a case of hegemony in three-country model, assuming country 1 issues
the only international currency. Figure 9 shows the payment system in this case,
where all the international trade is settled in country 1 currency. The following equi-
librium condition is in order.
For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.1.1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2) (3.1.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.1.3)
For seller pi121 = pi123 = J1φ1m21 − c(q21) > 0 (3.1.4)pi131 = pi132 = J1φ1m31 − c(q31) > 0 (3.1.5)
For investor
[
(1−2σ)φ1z1
]
(1+R1) = (n12 +n13)φ1m
1
1 +(n21 +n23)φ1m
2
1 +(n31 +n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.1.6)
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Money market
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
2
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.1.7)
σφ2m
2
2 = φ2M2 (3.1.8)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.1.9)
The incumbency advantage from proposition 1 still applies here: as long as individual
sellers enjoy positive profit from international trade, they have no incentive to deviate
from the existing equilibrium.
A.3.2 Dual dominance: PCP
Now consider the case of double international currencies where the international trade
between country 1 and 2 is settled through PCP, while country 3 relies on other
country’s currency for settlement. To achieve consistency of decision, country 3 sellers
choose country 1 currency to settle trade with country 2, which is the same as country
1 seller’s choice. Apply a similar procedure to other seller’s choice, and the payment
pattern is shown in figure 10, with the following equilibrium condition. For buyer
R1 = p11L(q
1
1) = (p21 + p23)L(q
2
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.2.1)
R2 = p22L(q
2
2) = (p13 + p12)L(q
1
2) (3.2.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.2.3)
For seller 
pi212 = pi
2
13 = J2φ2m
1
2 − c(q12) > 0 (3.2.4)
pi121 = pi
1
23 = J1φ1m
2
1 − c(q21) > 0 (3.2.5)
pi131 = pi
1
32 = J1φ1m
3
1 − c(q31) > 0 (3.2.6)
pi121 > pi
2
21 ⇒ J1φ2m12 − c(q12) > J2φ2m22 − c(q22) (3.2.7)
pi212 > pi
1
12 ⇒ J2φ2m12 − c(q12) > J1φ1m11 − c(q11) (3.2.8)
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For investor
[
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]
(1 +R1) = (n21 + n23)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.2.9)[
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]
(1 +R2) = (n12 + n13)φ2m
1
2 (3.2.10)
Money market
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
2
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.2.11)
σ(φ2m
2
2 + φ2m
1
2) + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (3.2.12)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.2.13)
With double international currencies, the incumbency advantage in proposition 1 is
no longer present. The existence of such equilibrium requires not only positive profit
for sellers, but also the incentive-compatible condition in (3.2.7) and (3.2.8), otherwise
deviation is justified.
A.3.3 Dual dominance: LCP
For another possibility of double international currency, assume the trade between
country 1 and 2 to be settled through LCP. Figure 3 shows the payment system, and
several equilibrium conditions follow. For buyer
R1 = (p11 + p12 + p13)L(q
1
1) = (p31 + p32)L(q
3
1) (3.3.1)
R2 = (p22 + p21 + p23)L(q
2
2) (3.3.2)
R3 = p33L(q
3
3) (3.3.3)
For seller 
pi112 = pi
1
13 = J1φ1m
1
1 − c(q11) > 0 (3.3.4)
pi221 = pi
2
23 = J2φ2m
2
2 − c(q22) > 0 (3.3.5)
pi131 = pi
1
32 = J1φ1m
3
1 − c(q31) > 0 (3.3.6)
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For investor
[
(1− 2σ)φ1z1
]
(1 +R1) = (n12 + n13)φ1m
2
1 + (n31 + n32)φ1m
3
1 (3.3.7)[
(1− 2σ)φ2z2
]
(1 +R2) = (n21 + n23)φ2m
2
2 (3.3.8)
Money market
σ(φ1m
1
1 + φ1m
3
1) + (1− 2σ)φ1z1 + F1 = φ1M1 (3.3.9)
σφ2m
2
2 + (1− 2σ)φ2z2 + F2 = φ2M2 (3.3.10)
σφ3m
3
3 = φ3M3 (3.3.13)
One interesting feature in this system is the pattern of IVC. For PCP in figure 10,
the trade between country 2 and 3 is completely settled by country 1 currency, while
for LCP in figure 11, there’s no such dominant IVC.
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Table 1 International function of money
For government For private agent
Store of value international reserve investment instrument
Medium of exchange FX intervention international trade settlement
Unit of account currency anchor denominate financial asset
Table 2 Currency regime
Regime Seller’s choice Description
Hegemony {si, sj} = {1, 0} Country i currency is international
Country j currency is national
PCP {s1, s2} = {1, 1} Two international currencies
Trade settled in seller’s home currency
LCP {s1, s2} = {0, 0} Two international currencies
Trade settled in buyer’s home currency
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Table 3 Monetary policy and international trade
Hegemony PCP LCP
home importer
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
∂q12
∂R1
= 0
∂q11
∂R1
< 0
home exporter ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0 ∂pi1
∂R1
< 0
∂pi∗1
∂R1
= 0
foreign importer
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q21
∂R1
< 0
∂q22
∂R1
= 0
foreign exporter
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0 ∂pi2
∂R1
= 0
∂pi∗2
∂R1
< 0
home net export ? ∂NX1
∂R1
< 0 ∂NX1
∂R1
> 0
foreign net export ? ∂NX2
∂R1
> 0 ∂NX2
∂R1
< 0
Notes: Country 1 is regarded as home country. In the first column, country 1 currency emerged
as the single international currency. For the second column, international trade is settled by seller’s
home currency. For the last column, international trade is settled by buyer’s home currency.
Table 4 Parameter choice
Parameter Value Description
1− α 0.5 degree of economic integration
β 0.966 discount factor
σ 0.5 share of buyer
θ 0.5 buyer’s bargaining power
F 0.01 fixed cost of banking sector
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Figure 1 Market share of financing agreement
Source: Asmundson et al. (2011)
Figure 2 Mechanism of LC
Source: adapted from Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2014)
Figure 3 Timing of model
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Figure 4 Optimal monetary policy
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Figure 5 Size effect
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Figure 6 Composition of welfare
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Figure 7 Size effect: high integration, α = 0.2
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Figure 8 Size effect: low integration, α = 0.5
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Figure 9 Three-country model: single international currency
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Figure 10 Three-country model: dual international currency, PCP
Figure 11 Three-country model: dual international currency, LCP
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